Effects of the command and control exercise on the customs administration

The Federal Chancellery (FC) conducts a Strategic Leadership Exercise (SFU) every four years. This exercise has two functions:

On the one hand, they allow reflection on an extraordinary situation at the strategic level and, on the other, they review interdepartmental coordination in a crisis. By Federal Council decision of 22 June 2016, the Federal Commission was tasked with organising, conducting and evaluating the SFU 17. The exercise was led by Federal Councillor Doris Leuthard, acting President of the Confederation in 2017. The General Secretaries' Conference (GSK) acted as the operational supervisory body. The SFU 17 scenario involved both the Confederation and the Canton of Geneva in the exercise.

The evaluation should also show whether the Federal Council received a decision-making basis that was appropriate to the situation and whether - where necessary - the bodies and persons involved from a technical or political point of view were involved. It was also examined whether communication between administrative units and other agencies was timely and factual.

In addition to observation reports, the evaluation team had at its disposal the products produced during the exercise (e.g. Federal Council motions, meeting minutes, media releases or social media contributions) and the participants' e-mails as sources for the evaluation. For the first time, communication tools such as social media were also included in the evaluation. However, the opportunity to reach the general public through social media was not used.

The second part of this report relates to the self-assessment of the participating departments and the Federal Chancellery (see link at the end of the text; chapter 3.2). An important section (Chapter 4) combines the reflections of the evaluation team and the participants on the further development of crisis management at federal level and further results and recommendations.

Different approaches
An evaluation team consisting of four staff members of the FC and one colleague from the SG DDPS analysed and evaluated the reports. This evaluation team itself was part of the exercise organisation and was not exercised.

In the past, SFUs were conducted on the following topics: 1997 Information Revolution, 2005 Epidemic in Switzerland, 2009 Electricity Shortage and 2013 Cyberattack. In view of the current threat situation, it was obvious to choose the topic of terrorism for SFU 17. According to the script, the Federal Council and the (inter-)departmental crisis teams had to deal with the effects of several terrorist attacks in Switzerland at cantonal, national and international level.

It described, in chronological order, a bomb alert with successful defusing of the explosive device at Geneva airport, a terrorist attack with many dead and injured at the underground Eaux-Vives railway station in Geneva, and an extortionist hostage-taking at the UN in Geneva. In addition, an act of sabotage interrupted the power supply to the Mühleberg nuclear power plant (NPP), causing an incident.

The scenario involved attacks on Switzerland by the fictitious terrorist organisation Global Liberation Front (GLF). The terrorist organisation had made its presence felt in the media in autumn 2017 with attacks in European capitals. General threats were made against international institutions and organisations. As a result, Switzerland as the seat of the UN - and Geneva in particular - also became the focus of the GLF.

"Time lost in resolving formal issues given."

The work at border crossings and airports is demanding in crisis situations. The customs officers' controls are not only important at neuralgic points such as railway stations; mobile control and observation tasks are also added. Border guards are becoming increasingly involved in national and international security cooperation. More topical than ever, see the past terrorist attacks in neighbouring countries and current large-scale demonstrations, the Swiss customs system must also be able to counter socio-political developments. - However, how does the Federal Customs Administration proceed in extreme situations?

Key findings on the SFU
SFU 17 was a two-day staff exercise. The evaluation report states that the participants reacted to the simulated events at their own discretion. The exercise observers thus discovered some security gaps in individual federal units, such as here in the Federal Border Service:

"In the FDJP, but also in other departments, (too) much time was wasted on clarifying formal questions (keyword border closures / introduction of border controls / admissibility of an intervention on UN territory)", it says in chapter 3.2 ("View of the individual departments").

A finding that crystallized alongside the point of "lack of human resources" at SFU 17:

For the most part, federal employees obtained information via e-mails and mobile telephones. The working method in the area of external communication was largely based on day-to-day business. In order to ensure uniform external communication, individual language rules were even drawn up. However, communication was not geared to the needs of specific target groups (population, economy, cantons, foreign countries).

What was missing, for example, despite repeated pressure from outside, was a targeted language regulation by the FDFA for the Swiss foreign network on the one hand and for the foreign representations based in Switzerland on the other. In any case, there was a lack of human resources almost everywhere, including in the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP).

"Such gaps in the FDJP did not allow for deputies or replacements, resulting in multiple people having to be on duty all the time."

Conclusions
The exercise was played without interruption for 29 hours. The events of SFU 17 were broadcast by e-mail and telephone or on the exercise website with specially created radio, press and social media contributions as well as official (media) releases.

The data for the final evaluation was read in during the exercise. Like many other departments, the Federal Customs Administration (FCA) needs to catch up:

- – Knowledge
Crisis management was inefficient in some cases because there was a lack of clarity regarding processes and responsibilities (e.g. request for army support, request for border closure, UN area of responsibility). The knowledge of what to do or who is responsible was often available in the departments, but did not reach the management bodies everywhere. (Source: SFU 17 / Finding 6)

- recommendation
The departments and the FC must ensure that their employees are aware of the procedures that apply in a crisis, as well as the corresponding competences and responsibilities. The departments should therefore clarify processes and responsibility regulations that have led to uncertainties in the exercise: E.g. border closure / introduction of border controls, request for military support, responsibilities for cooperation with international organizations. (Source: SFU 17 / Recommendation 6)

In fact, it is not so easy to define crisis processes across geographical boundaries. Some trouble spots have a global dimension, others a national or even only regional dimension. However, communication "with each other" is crucial for determining appropriate strategies and crisis measures.

Technological change, for example in the field of telecommunications, has recently eroded many of the original natural communication monopolies. Therefore, the coordination of information and services in different regions is and remains important against international crises.